The Android pattern unlock is a widely adopted graphical password system that requires a user to draw a secret pattern connecting points arranged in a grid. The theoretical security of pattern unlock can be defined by the number of possible patterns. However, only upper bounds of the number of patterns have been known except for 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 grids for which the exact number of patterns was found by brute-force enumeration. In this letter, we present the first lower bound by computing the minimum number of visible points from each point in various subgrids.
Introduction
The Android pattern unlock is a graphical password system that was introduced on Android version 1.0 as an alternative to traditional text-based password systems. A pattern password consists of a sequence of four or more contact points arranged in a grid and the security level of the pattern password is determined by the size of the pattern space. While CyanLockScreen [1] provides grids from 3 × 3 to 6 × 6 and Security Lock Screen [2] up to 25 × 25, the total number of possible patterns is only known for 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 grids that was obtained by brute-force enumeration; there are 389,112 ( 2 19 ) patterns in a 3×3 grid and 4,350,069,823,024 ( 2 42 ) patterns in a 4 × 4 grids [3] , [4] . The brute-force enumeration is not a candidate method for counting the number of patterns in a large grid because the number of pattern grows too fast.
For grids of large size, only upper bounds are known for the number of patterns: permutation-based upper bound [5] and visibility-based upper bound [6] . Upper bounds enable people to avoid exaggerating the security of pattern unlock but it is a lower bound that guarantees the Manuscript minimum security level of pattern unlock. To answer questions such as "what size of grid should be used for 2 80 security level?", a lower bound is required. In this letter, we provide the first lower bound for Android unlock patterns by calculating the minimum visibility of each point in subgrids where already-visited points are removed.
Visibility-Based Lower Bound

Derivation of Lower Bound
In the Android pattern unlock system, a user can select a secret pattern according to the following rules [7] :
(i) At least four points must be chosen, (ii) No point can be used twice, (iii) Only straight lines are allowed, and (iv) One cannot jump over points not visited before.
Let G be a grid that is a set of points in the plane with integer coordinates and G α×β be a grid with α rows and β columns. We use the Cartesian coordinate system to denote a pattern p as a sequence of points (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . where the origin is the point at the lower left corner. For example, the N-shaped pattern in Fig. 1 can be expressed by the sequence (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2) . The number of points in a grid G is denoted by |G|. The length of a pattern p is the number of points in p and denoted by |p|.
For a grid G, let N(G) be the number of patterns and N k (G) the number of patterns of length k. Since a pattern should be a sequence of four or more points by rule (i), we have
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where (x, y) (x , y ) means that (x , y ) is visible from (x, y), i.e., there is a direct path from (x, y) to (x , y ). If the first point of a pattern is (x, y), the number of ways to choose the second point is V((x, y); G). Figure 2 depicts the visible points from (0, 0) and (1, 1) 
After a point (x i , y i ) is chosen as the ith point of a pattern, it can be jumped over afterwards (by rule (iv)); hence, the chosen (or visited) point (x i , y i ) can be regarded as removed from the grid. Let G −i be the set of subgrids of G with |G −i | = |G| − i.
where G\D = G − D is the subgrid consisting of points in G that are not in D. We define the minimum visibility of G −i as the minimum number of ways to choose the (i + 2)th point of a pattern, over the choice of the (i + 1)th point, after i points have been chosen (or removed) as follows:
The minimum visibility of G −i for a point (x, y) is defined by v((x, y);
v(G −i ) of Eq. (5) can be expressed in terms of v((x, y); G −i ) of Eq. (7).
where the third equality follows because V((x, y); G\D) = ⊥ for (x, y) G\D by Eq. (2). Consider patterns p = (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x i−1 , y i−1 ) and p = (
Since a pattern is a sequence of points where order matters, the number of patterns p that extends p is V(( (7), we can get the relation between the number of patterns of length i and that of length i − 1 as follows:
which gives
Now, we can derive the visibility-based lower bound as follows:
where the inequality follows from Eq. (10) and N 1 (G) = |G|.
Computation of Lower Bound
To calculate the lower bound of Eq. (11), we need the values v(G −i ) for i = 0, 1, . . . , |G| − 2. By Eq. 
j=0 m j with m 0 = 0. In step (a), we compute the angle θ between (x, y) and (x , y ) by θ = atan2(y − y, x − x). In a variety of programming languages, the function atan2(·, ·) is the arctangent function with two arguments [8] . The purpose of using two arguments instead of one is to gather information on the signs of the inputs in order to return the appropriate quadrant of the computed angle. For any real number arguments a and b not both equal to zero, atan2(b, a) ∈ (−π, π] is the angle in radians between the positive X-axis of a plane and the point given by the coordinates (a, b) on it.
Consider (x, y) = (0, 0) in G 4×4 (Fig. 2) . The angle θ = atan2(y − y, x − x) is 0 for (x , y ) = (1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), π 4 for (x , y ) = (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3) , and π 2 for (x , y ) = (0, 1), (0, 2), (0, 3), which shows that S is a multiset. We sort the angles in step (b) and count the multiplicity of each angle in step (c); the multiplicity m of an element θ in a multiset S is the number of instances of θ in S . For example, (θ, m) = ( π 4 , 3) indicates that there are three points (x , y ) satisfying θ = atan2(y − y, x − x) = π 4 for (x, y) = (0, 0). The list L = (θ 1 , m 1 ), (θ 2 , m 2 ), . . . , (θ τ , m τ ) is arranged in order of increasing multiplicity, i.e., m j ≤ m j+1 . Since all points (x , y ) (x, y) are counted in the list L, the sum of the multiplicities is |G| − 1, i.e., τ j=1 m j = |G| − 1. From the list L = (θ 1 , m 1 ), (θ 2 , m 2 ), . . . , (θ τ , m τ ) , we can compute v((x, y); G −i ) for i = 0, 1, . . . , |G| − 2. First, we have v((x, y); G 0 ) = τ because the angles of visible points from (x, y) are θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ τ . For G −1 , the number of visible points from (x, y) does not change if we remove a point (x , y ) ∈ G with multiplicity m > 1 and decreases by one if we remove a point with multiplicity m = 1. In general, the number of visible points decreases by one only if we remove m j points having the same angle θ j . Since we are interested in the minimum visibility of G −i for (x, y), we reduce the number of visible points as fast as possible by removing points in order of increasing multiplicity. If points of angel θ 1 (with multiplicity m 1 ) are removed, the visibility becomes τ − 1. If points of angel θ 1 and θ 2 are removed, the visibility becomes τ − 2. Generally, if points of angle θ j for j = 1, 2, . . . , are removed, the visibility becomes τ − . Therefore, we have v((x, y);
where m 0 = 0 and τ j=0 m j = |G| − 1. We can compute v(G −i ) = min (x,y)∈G v((x, y); G −i ) by finding the minimum value of v((x, y); G −i ) for (x, y) ∈ G. The visibility-based lower bound can be computed by plugging the values of v(G −i ) into Eq. (11). Table 1 presents nu- merical data of the visibility-based lower bound and upper bound, from which the security of Android unlock patterns can be estimated. The total time to compute the lower bound in Table 1 (e.g., G 25×25 ) was less than one second with a desktop PC.
Time-Precision Tradeoff
By spending more computation time, we can improve the lower bound of Eq. (11). If one is willing to compute N γ (G) where γ ≤ 3 (e.g., by brute-force enumeration), Eq. (11) can be rewritten as follows:
For example, the lower bound for G 3×3 can be improved to 4.42E+4 by Eq. (13) with N 3 (G 3×3 ) = 320.
Remark 1. If one is willing to spend even more computing power to calculate N j (G) for all j ∈ [4, γ] where γ ≥ 4, then Eq. (13) can be extended to
. nfortunately, this extension does not seem to be applicable to a large grid because bruteforce enumeration is currently the only way to compute N j (G).
Discussion
When we compare N(G 3×3 ) = 389, 112 (or N(G 4×4 ) = 4, 350, 069, 823, 024) with the visibility-based upper bound of [6] and the visibility-based lower bound of Eq. (11), it is the upper bound that is more accurate. This is partially because the event of the minimum visibility seems to happen with a relatively low probability. In step (c) of Sect. 2.2, the list L is computed for each point (x, y) in a grid. For example, consider the list L = (θ 1 , m 1 ), . . . , (θ τ , m τ ) = (26.6 • , 1), (63.4 • , 1), (0 • , 2), (45 • , 2), (90 • , 2) for the point (x, y) = (0, 0) in G 3×3 where angles are expressed in degrees. From the list L, we have v((0, 0); G 0 3×3 ) = τ = 5. To compute the minimum visibility v((0, 0); G −1 3×3 ), we remove the point having the smallest multiplicity, i.e., the point corresponding to (26.6 • , 1), which leads to v((0, 0); G −1 3×3 ) = 4. Note that the list L tells us that two angles have multiplicity 1 and three angles have multiplicity 2, i.e., removing one of 2 points corresponding to θ = 26.6 • , 63.4 • decreases the visibility but removing one of 6 points corresponding to θ = 0 • , 45 • , 90 • does not decrease the visibility. Therefore, the probability that the visibility actually decreases is only 25% but we assume this event of 25% probability to compute the minimum visibility. On the contrary, the event of 75% probability is assumed to compute the maximum visibility in [6] and thus the upper bound tends to provide more accurate approximation of the security level. † Even though the upper bound of [6] is a more accurate approximation (at least for N(G 3×3 ) and N(G 4×4 )), it is not known how fast the gap between the upper bound and N(G n×n ) grows as n increases. In addition, people do not choose a pattern uniformly at random and have some bias in the pattern selection process [7] . Therefore, we recommend that one should be as conservative as possible when estimating the security level of the Android pattern unlock; the lower bound of Eq. (11) is less accurate but provides a guaranteed security whereas the upper bound of [6] is more accurate but provides an overestimated security.
Remark 2.
In [6] , the multiset of angles S was mistakenly defined by S = { y −y
x −x | (x , y ) ∈ G and (x , y ) (x, y)}. Note that y −y
x −x cannot distinguish between upward directions and downward directions; e.g., for (x, y) = (1, 1) in G 3×3 , we have y −y
x −x = 1 for both (x , y ) = (2, 2) and (x , y ) = (0, 0). Therefore, the multiset S in [6] should be defined by S = {θ | θ = atan2(y − y, x − x) for (x , y ) ∈ G and (x , y ) (x, y)}.
Conclusion
Theoretically, the exact security level of the Android pattern † We do not claim that the event of the minimum visibility always happens with a smaller probability. We just want to give a possible reason for the large gap between the lower bound and the exact value by explaining typical cases.
unlock system can be computed by counting the number of patterns in a grid. However, a mathematical formula for the exact number of patterns is not known even for the simplest case of the 3 × 3 grid [5] . Instead, the security level can be roughly estimated by using the lower bound of Eq. (11) and the upper bound of [6] . According to the numerical data in Table 1 , there is still a considerable gap between the lower and upper bounds. We invite readers to the research on tighter bounds for the security of unlock patterns.
